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In political and moral philosophy we are used to an uninterrupted 
succession of texts, heirs of the liberal traditions (headed by John 
Rawls), communitarians (led by the likes of Michael Sandel, Charles 
Taylor, etc.), analytical Marxists (authors like Gerald Cohen, Jon 
Elster, etc.). 
Besides the names mentioned above, there is a succession of 
texts that tend to give rise to a sense of routine and, as a result, of 
lethargy. It is the feeling that political and moral philosophy has 
reached a plateau within a set of accepted doctrines. Doctrines which, 
to paraphrase Thomas Kuhn, make up a kind of “normal science” of 
philosophical theory. 
But from time to time, the routine drowsiness is sharply 
interrupted. This happens when works of philosophy show up to 
question prevailing theories in political philosophy. Such is the case 
of the work I propose to review herein. It is the work of Mexican 
philosopher René González de la Vega, whose text on political 
philosophy features philosophical rigour, originality and depth.
René González de la Vega's main purpose in this work is to 
reconstruct the conceptual nature of a crucial concept: that of tolerance. 
His purpose is not historical but rather the analytical reconstruction of 
the concept in question. A reconstruction that he carries out in the first 
three parts of the book, from chapter 1 to 10. 
Why is the concept of tolerance crucial? The answer is two-fold. 
On one hand, because tolerance is the kind of concept that, in everyday 
life, facilitates a more or less peaceful coexistence among citizens 
who do not share the same conceptions regarding what is good. But 
on the other hand, the concept is pivotal because it allows the shrewd 
philosopher to expose systematically most of the main problems 
political and moral philosophers discuss with regard to notions such as 





the nature of moral reasons, the importance of individuals' ethical 
lives, etc. That is to say that the concept of tolerance is a “master key” 
for joining the debate meditating on a large part of the conceptual 
agenda faced by practical philosophers. 
As one browses the pages of Tolerance and Modern Liberalism one 
cannot help but show enthusiasm upon encountering a philosopher who 
is making a genuine contribution to political and moral philosophy. 
The author identifies three underlying features of the use of the 
concept of tolerance: i) there are convictions that may be injured by 
others' attitudes or behaviours; ii) there is an underlying power or 
competition of the “injured” person to act against the act affecting her; 
and iii) the rational need arises for a “balance” to offset the strength of 
the value of the injured conviction before the supposed value given to 
non-interference in another's behaviour (p. xv). 
The three features mentioned account for why the concept 
of tolerance is normative (p. xvi). This is so because, in exercising 
tolerance, moral, political and rationally practical norms are upheld 
which determine when tolerance is “genuine” and “proper” and when 
it is not genuine and refers to behaviours labelled as “acceptance”, 
“indifference”, “patience” or “resignation”, etc. 
Tolerance has been a nuclear concept of deontological theories, 
developed by philosophers of a Kantian influence who represent 
political liberalism, like John Rawls. René González de la Vega focuses 
on three representatives of this current: John Rawls (chapter 7), 
Ernesto Garzón Valdés (chapter 8) and Rainer Forst (chapter 9). All 
three of these authors share two features:
a) The priority of correctness over goodness
b) The existence of suitable mechanisms to resolve rationally 
the moral and political conflicts that might arise when the 
individuals who form part of a society exercise tolerance.
Both features mentioned form the “normal science” of deontological 
theories. However it is here that González de la Vega identifies two 
serious problems raised by the conjunction of the two features 
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tolerance produces within deontological theories (for example, chapter 
15). According to deontologism, an act “x” of tolerance is completely 
exhaustive for the future. The fact that subject S tolerates “x”, or does 
not tolerate x, results in the fact that subject S's normative conviction 
(let's call it “y”) is “eliminated” from S's moral system (if she tolerates) 
or “confirmed” (if she does not). For our author, deontologism creates 
a paradoxical or “suicidal” concept of tolerance (p. xvii; pp. 139-141). 
Because what is tolerated today stops being an act of tolerance in the 
future as the system has been moralized a single time through the 
tolerator's behaviour.
The second problem deontologism leads us to is that it returns 
to the “recalcitrant” concept of tolerance (chapter 11). This can be 
explained by the low (or non-existent) sensitivity deontologism has to 
the phenomenon of moral conflict (chapter 13). For the deontologist, 
tolerance does not generate genuine moral conflicts (or dilemmas). 
Tolerance does not configure a recalcitrant concept. 
Nevertheless, when individuals exercise tolerance, it is easy to 
find numerous cases of tolerance dilemmas. In this work, the author 
poses a number of examples (the teacher, the fashion designer, the 
homophobe, etc.). 
For purposes of this review, I shall pause briefly at one of the 
examples addressed in the book: that of the liberal vegetarian mother 
who must decide whether or not she tolerates her red-meat loving son. 
The author's point is that the liberal mother may find herself drawn into 
a recalcitrant situation in which it becomes difficult for her to decide 
whether to tolerate her son or not. From the point of view of her liberalism, 
the mother must respect her son's autonomy and free development. 
From the point of view of her moral compassion for the suffering of 
animals, she should not tolerate her son's love of meat. Nevertheless, 
this real, concrete situation seems underrated by deontologism. 
Up to this point, René González de la Vega's work could be 
said to make two significant contributions.  Firstly, the work shows 
the paradoxical (suicidal) and recalcitrant aspects that result from 
exercising tolerance. Secondly, the author reconstructs how the 





Besides exposing the paradoxical and recalcitrant aspects of 
tolerance, the work also makes another considerable contribution. This 
contribution links with the idea that tolerance is not just a normative 
concept but that, contrary to deontologism, tolerance appears to be a 
concept that rationally demands “contextual” responses (chapter 17). 
Deontologism is a distinctly universalist theory that pays little 
attention to the “salient” features of concrete cases of tolerance. 
Hence the rigidity of deontological logic. However, it is upon concrete 
features, for example on whether the mother is liberal or not, or why 
she is or isn't vegetarian, that the moral theory should reflect.
 The author's proposal is that attention to the context is compatible 
with moral particularism (p. 213). Illuminated by Jonathan Dancy's 
contributions, René González de la Vega defends a particularism that 
does not respond to rules and principles but only to reasons. This 
indicates that sensitivity for the concrete will inescapably lead to a 
different way of understanding principles and rules. According to 
this way, the rules and principles were built based on our experience 
of the concrete. It is not a question of abjuring rules or principles. 
It's just a question of changing the perspective of the analysis giving 
greater emphasis to processes like the “perception” of salient features 
of cases of tolerance and their narrative aspects. This methodological 
approach must be prior to the fact of starting out by inferring practical 
consequences rigidly from the norms, which is typical of deontologism. 
But the defence of a contextual aspect in the moral reasoning 
pertaining to tolerance is not all René González de la Vega has to offer. 
Firstly because the author's concentration on what is paradoxical and 
conflictive in respect to tolerance does not just warn us of the unnecessary 
rigidity of deontological theories. He now adds an awareness of the 
possibly “tragic” aspect of tolerance to his contextualist contribution. 
Indeed, many of the dilemmas of tolerance relate to a collision 
between the existence of ideal moral norms, on one hand, characteristic 
of the situation of an unbiased observer, and the norms of our ethical 
life, of the way we understand the goodness or badness of our actions, 
on the other. Deontologism attempts to minimize this collision by 
distinguishing between two normative systems, A basic one where the 
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found. And another system, justificatoy or ideal, that is the one possibly 
requiring the conviction be eliminated. The basic system reflects the 
character of the moral agent. The justificatory system would reflect an 
ideal morality based on the requirement to make unbiased decisions.
By placing the tolerance situation within “two” independent 
systems, moral conflicts are “untangled”. In other words, the conflicts 
dissolve. Deontologism's inability to capture the tragic aspect of 
certain conflicts is revealed with this approach. The conflict that arises 
between ideal norms and the norms of our own ethical life. 
In choosing whether or not to tolerate, the tolerator may 
experience “moral loss” or “moral residue”. That is to say, Tolerance 
and Modern Liberalism shows that even tolerance is unable to eradicate 
feelings of moral loss. Such sensations may originate from having 
made a decision which, though grounded in the justificatory system, 
entails a moral loss for the tolerant subject. 
One weakness of deontologism within the context mentioned 
might be that it “alienates” subjects within an ideal ethics (typical of 
the justificatory system) that disregards how important a subject's 
ethical life (her basic system) is for her character and integrity. 
Lastly, René González de la Vega proposes that tolerance 
should not be a normative concept, understanding normative in 
the deontological sense. His contribution is based on considering 
tolerance as an “aretaic” concept, that is to say, based on virtues. 
The virtue theorist seeks to minimize, in a sense unlike the 
deontological sense, the moral loss experienced after decisions made 
in the context of cases of tolerance. It is not a question of alienating 
the subject or of distinguishing two different normative systems: the 
basic and the justificatory systems. It is more about tolerant subjects, 
in being virtuous, becoming wiser: they will learn to see the salient 
features of cases of tolerance. In knowing how to see such features, they 
will seek a way for the ideal norms based on correctness not to collide 
brutally with the norms of our ethical lives. 
So if I had to summarize the essence of this work, I would say that 
it amounts to an original effort that offers meditated answers to focal 





dose of Aristotelianism (in how they receive the aretaic approach) with, 
in my opinion, a Hegelian touch. This is so because the author seeks to 
reconcile us to the importance of “our own” ethical conceptions of the 
good life. 
Although the book in question targets the deontologism typical of 
political liberalism, this does not imply that the author is not a certain 
complex form of liberal. A liberal who, along with certain sensitivity for 
rules and principles, notices the risk involved in forgetting the ethical 
conceptions that define our moral identities. And here there is another 
wink at authors like Michael Sanders who, not in vain, are cited near 
the end of the book.
However, this is not a book to which only Aristotelian, Hegelian 
or Aristotelian liberals like Charles Larmore will feel attracted to on 
account of a corporate identity. 
Deontologists will want to read it and respond to the objections 
raised by the author. Thus for example, philosophers enrolled in this 
current will want to point out that the convictions of future tolerant 
subjects must be rational, not prejudiced or capricious. Our ethical lives 
are not always heavenly. Many norms that identify our convictions appear 
to us as moral. However, a reflexive inspection reveals their obscurantist, 
revengeful or prejudiced nature. Thus the homophobe who interferes 
with gay pride parades every time he can would be hard put to defend 
his acts of interference as “truly” moral. For there to be a genuine moral 
conflict between both norms, the ideal and those of our ethical lives, they 
must demonstrate the same justificatory weight. Otherwise the dilemma 
would be false. With which the feeling of moral loss would lack practical 
significance. Such a sensation would only reveal the psychological nature 
of an aggressive subject's fears and hates. 
Deontologists might also attempt to accommodate the idea 
of a contextual response within their theoretical structure. They 
might say that the particularism of reasons is something a neo-
Kantian theorist might reformulate without falling into the possible 
vices of particularism. Among which, the deontologist would say, 
is particularists' potential inability to grasp the need for moral 
generalizations built on the basis of decisions of cases of tolerance. 




González de la Vega, René. (2017). Tolerance and Modern Liberalism. From Paradox
 to Aretaic Moral Ideal. Maryland, United States of America: Lexington. 231 pp.
or less tolerant “societies”. There would be as many tolerances and 
intolerances as tolerators there were. Thus universalism could restore 
its capacity for reasonableness, accommodating the value of the 
salient features of cases without sacrificing the generality of rules and 
principles on account of it. Rules and principles which, paraphrasing 
Jon Elster, make up the “cement” of society. Nevertheless, the author 
could respond to these types of objections that his perspective, in 
discerning between the particularism of rules and the particularism of 
reasons, gives generalizations an important role. The universalist would 
in turn respond that the distinction between “rules” and “reasons” is 
not very clear if we admit that the identity of a rule depends on the types 
of reasons it brings together.
All in all, the work proposes topics for heated discussion. And if 
it does, it is because it is able, like any important work, to provoke good 
discussions. I am quite sure no rational reader will be able to remain 
indifferent to the variety, depth and subtlety of the author's arguments.
Guillermo Lariguet1
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina
Correo electrónico: gclariguet@gmail.com 
ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3737-5688 
1 Este trabajo ha sido posible a Conicet y al apoyo complementario de  las siguientes 
instituciones de Argentina: SECYT (UNC),  PIP (Conicet), CAID (UNL) y de España el siguiente 
DER2016-74898-C2-1-R.
